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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff a.nd Respondent,
-

CASE NO.

vs.-

8564

FREDERICK RAY SIBERT,
Defendant and Appellant

Appellant's Brief
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant in this action was charged with the
armed robbery of one, Lyle Thomas Butters. The case
was tried before a jury and a verdict of guilty returned
by the jury. At the trial, the complaining witness, Lyle
Thomas Butters, testified regarding the facts surrounding the alleged robbery, and after having been crossexamined by counsel representing the defendant, the
1
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State offered as a corroborating witness Police Officer
John J. Ferrin who testified to what the complaining witness had told him at the time he investigated the alleged
robbery. This evidence was permitted to be given over
the objections of counsel (Tr. p. 47-50). The Court then
admitted in evidence, over counsel's objection, the notes
'vhich Officer Ferrin had taken regarding the conversation that he had had with the complaining witness Butters
(Tr. p. 51).
On the 9th day of June, 1956, the defendant was sentenced by the Honorable Ray VanCott, Jr. The Court
denied the defendant probation on the ground that he still
denied his guilt after the verdict of the jury (Tr. p. 121).
From the verdict of the jury and the judgment entered thereon, and from the sentence of the trial court,
the appellant appeals.
POIXT I.
THE TRIAL COl...RT ERRED IN AD~IITTING
THE TESTI:.\£0?\:y OF OFFICER FERRIN
_A_ND IX .._\D~IITTIXG HIS XOTES I~ EVIDJ1~XC~E.

Th<? State called as its second "·itness at the trial
of this en8t) Offiet)r John J. Ferrin. The State had Sergeant Ft)rriu '8 notes marked as ''Exhibit 1'' and preH(\111 ing tht)nl to St)rgeant Ferrin asked him to testify
regarding 1he notes. From these notes Officer Ferrin was
a llo\\'t\d, over tht) dt)fendant 's objection, to testify to the
conversation bet\\~Pt)n himself and the "·itness Butters
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subsequent to the alleged robbery (see Tr. pp. 46-51).
The testimony of Sergeant Ferrin as to what the witness Butters told him was in considerable more detail
than was the testimony of the witness Butters. It included
a description of the alleged robber, given in some detail,
a description of his clothing, the color of the car, and the
license number, and of the conversation that allegedly
took place between the robber and the witness Butters.
Apparently, to corroborate the testimony of Sergeant Ferrin the State offered notes of Sergeant Ferrin
which he had used to refresh his recollection regarding
the heresay testimony just admitted in evidence. Over the
objection of defendant's counsel the notes of Officer Ferrin were admitted in evidence ( Tr. p. 51). It should be
noted that up until the time that Sergeant Ferrin testified, the State's entire case rested upon the rather weak
and unsatisfactory testimony of the witness Butters.
The somewhat narrow question on appeal is whether
or not it was proper for the trial judge to permit Officer
Ferrin to testify to facts that the witness Butters had
told him occurred, and whether it was improper to admit
the officer's notes of his conversation with Butters. It
should be noted that prior to the offering of the testimony
of Sergeant Ferrin, no witness had been offered to contradict the testimony of the witness Butters. Butters
had been subjected to cross-examination regarding his
testimony and regarding inconsistent testimony that he
had given at the preliminary hearing of the case. The
State apparently offered Sergeant Ferrin's testimony
under the theory that the witness Butters had been im3
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peached, and the Ferrin testimony should. be allowed to
rehabilitate Butters.
.
A minority of jurisdictions have held that where a
witness is impeached by testimony that he told a different
story on another occasion than the one that he told under
oath at the trial, evidence may be offered to show that he
told a consistent story at a time prior to the alleged inconsistent statement. The majority of courts, and certainly
the better-reasoned decisions, reject this exception to the
Heresay Rule that some courts have attempted to make,
and prohibit the admission of heresay testimony to rehabilitate a witness even when he has been impeached by the
positive testimony of anotker witness.
The Supreme Court of the United States has examined this problem, and in the case of Ellicott vs. Pe(};rl, 10
Peters 412, 9 Law Ed., 475, Justice Storey stated the majority rule, and the reasoning for it:
""\\:--here 1ritness proof has been offered
against the testimony of a witness under oath in
order to impeach his Yeracity establishing that he
has g-iYen a different account at another time, we
are of the opinion that in general evidence is not
admissible in order to confirm his testimony to
pro,·e that at other times he has given the same
;1ceount a~ he has under oath; for it is but his mere
declaration of the fact, and that is not evidence.
!lis fcstl:nlvuy under oath is better et·idence than
his coujirn1afory declaration.._'\ not under oath; and
the repetition of his assertio·ns does 'not carry his
credibil if .II further, if so far, as his oath. We say,
in gen(:}ral, because there are exceptions, but they
n rt• of a peculiar nature not applicable to the cirruni~t.nHct}s of the present rase. n (Italics supplied)
4
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In the case of Nicholas vs. Stewart, 20 Ala. 358, the
Court said that when the credibility of a witness is impeached by the fact that he has given a different account
of the transaction from that to which he swears the
fact that upon another occasion he stated the transaction precisely as he now testifies to it, does not disprove the inconsistency, and to allow inconsistencies in
the testimony of a witness shown by his sworn testimony
prevciously given to be removed by his own declarations out of court would be a dangerous departure from
the rule which requires all evidence to be given under
the sanction of an oath.
It would be an unfortunate situation indeed if the
defendant's counsel by cross-examining a State's witness would open the case up to a host of corroborating
w·itnesses who could follow the witness just cross-examined and testify that he had told them at a previous time
the same story that he testified to in court. If this were
the rule, defendant's counsel would not dare to crossexamine a State's witness regarding any inconsistency in
his testimony without running the risk of opening the
case up to a host of witnesses offering heresay testimony
under the guise of corroborating an impeached witness.
In People vs. Doyel!, 48 Cal. 85, the Court said regarding this problem:
''The witness cannot be confirmed by proof
that he has given the same account before, for his
mere declaration is not evidence. Ilis having given
a different account, although not under oath, necessarily impeaches either his veracity or his memory; but his having asserted the same thing does
5
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not in general carry his credibility further than,
nor so far as, his oath."
In Chicago City Realty Co., vs. Matthieson, 212 Ill.
292, 72 N.E. 443, the Court in analyzing this problem said:
''If two statements are contradictory, they
cannot both be true, and the fact that they were
made tends to show that the witness is unreliable
on account of an uncertain memory or want of
truthfulness. It seems clear that such evidence
could not be overcome or explained by proving
that the witness at some other time made a stateJnent consistent trith his testimony. The witness is
discredited by the fact that he has contradicted
himself and related the transaction in different
,,·ays, and to admit evidence that at some time he
has made a statement consistent with his testimony would only show that at different times he
has been making different statements about the
same matter.', (Italics supplied)

EYen those poorly reasoned cases which permit the
State to reha hili tate an impeached witness by offering anr•ther "·itness to testify
. that he told the same stor'. to this
\YitiH_)~s that he testified to under oath, would not permit
such heresay testimon~· in a e-ase such as the one presented
h.v this appt•aL "·here the "·itness \\as simply asked about
prior inconsistent statements made under oath. It should
l }(l nob ~d that the onlY
inconsistencY
•'
. that the witness Butter~ ".<ls t)x~1miued in regard to ,,·as his testimony about
11H) eo lor of 1ht• uutoznobile, and yet the Court permitted
()fliCl 1' r~\,rrin to reeount \Yhat Butters had told him regn rd i11g the f'ncts of the robbery, the description of the
nlh\gPd robb<'I', nnd nn l'Yen more complete account of the
i11('ideut than the \Yitness Butters himself offered to give.
1
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:Jianifestly, if the testimony of Officer Ferrin was heresay
and inadmissible, the admission of Officer Ferrin's penciled notes (Exhibit 1) was also error, and permitting the
jury to examine and read the notes constituted a powerful heresay corroboration of the witness Butters' testimony which was highly prejudicial to the defendant's
case.
The dangers of permitting such a thing are obvious.
Investigating officers are professional witnesses, and ordinarily are impressive witnesses. At the trial of any
criminal action, the jury is asked to pass upon the credibility of the State's witnesses. If, thereafter the defendant's counsel attacks the credibility of a State's witness
on cross-examination, the rule contended for by the State
\\I'"Ould permit the State to reinforce this testimony by experienced and impressive witnesses who could tell the
jury the story of the crime just as the State's eyevvitness
had told it to them. The jury might very well, having no
knowledge of the rules of evidence, be far more impressed
by the testimony of the police officers than they would be
by the testimony of the eye,vitness and treat it as substantive evidence, and to permit this would open the dool'
to all of the evils that the Heresay Rule was designed to
prevent. The police officers could not be cross-examined,
and their credibility could not be put on issue since they
are only telling to the jury what one of the State's witnesses told to them.
The defendant submits that to permit Officer Ferrin,
a po,verful professional "\vitness, to testify abo11t the facts
that he had heard from the witness Butters, and to admit
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his notes of such conversation in evidence, was highly
prejudicial to the defendant's case, and the admission of
this improper evidence was reversible error on the part
of the trial judge.

POINT II.
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S REFUSAL TO GRANT
THE DEFENDANT PROBATION ON THE
GROUND THAT HE WOULD NOT CONFESS
HIS GUILT CONSTITUTES ERROR.
Title 77-35-17, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides that:
''Upon a plea of guilty or conviction of any
crime or offense, if it appears compatible with
the public interest, the Court having jurisdiction
may suspend the imposition or the execution of
sentence, and may place the defendant on probation for such period of time as the Court shall
determine.''
This statute contemplates that if it is compatible
"·ith the public interest a defendant convicted of a crime
may be placed on probation, and it -vests in the trial judge
discretionary power to determine ''Thether or not it is
compatible "·ith the public interest that the defendant be
plaeed on probation. The exercise of a.ny such discretion
must be based upon a sound and proper basis. The Court
in this east' in sentencing the defendant Sibert refused the
defPndnnt probation and based this refusal largely upon
the faet. that thP defendant would not confess his guilt.
Tht' Court said:
the judgment and sentence of the court is
t.h:lt for the erime of robbery, of "·hich you were
4

'

8
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

convicted, you are sentenced to the indeterminate
term as provided for by law, in the penitentiary of
the State of Utah. Now, I can't grant you probation for several reasons, one of which, of course,
is that you deny your guilt in this matter, and of
course, we do not put defendants on probation as
a rule where they do that, because there is no reformation to be made. They are not guilty in their
own minds, so there is nothing that the Probation
Department can do for them" (Tr. p. 114).
If this reasoning of the Court's is sound, and is a
valid basis for the exercising of the Court's discretion,
then a defendant in a criminal action must decide after
he is convicted whether to confess guilt to the Probation
authorities, or face the denial of probation and be committed to the penitentiary. The defendant cannot bring a
motion for a new trial, or appeal his conviction until after
he has been sentenced, and yet under the theory of the
trial court in this case, if he denies his guilt after a verdict of conviction he cannot have probation. If he were
to confess guilt in order to avoid losing his right to probation, and he was granted a new trial or his conviction
reversed and the case remanded for a new trial, the officials of the Probation Department could appear as witnesses against him. Thus the effect of the Court's reasoning in this case is to force the defendant to either testify against himself, or have probation denied him. Such
a requirement would certainly violate the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and \vould
be a deprivation of any defendant's rights.
We must be realistic and recognize that many <ln innocent man has been convicted by a jury, and to adopt a
9
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rule that a man after having been convicted by a jury
must confess guilt to the Probation authorities in order to
be entitled to consideration for probation, places upon a
defendant a burden that is unjust and repugnant to the
western system of law. I have examined the authorities
to find any case in western law that would support such
a doctrine and I am unable to find any such authority. On
the other hand, this philosophy is in harmony with eastern systems of law where it is considered entirely appropriate to require a confession before the defendant is
granted any consideration for clemency by the court.
This question, as far as I have been able to determine, has never before been presented to the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah, or to any other appellate
court in the United States, and is presented here in this
appeal for the consideration of the Court without a citation of authorities, because this rule as announced by the
trial court is without precedent so far as the appellant
has been able to determine.

This appellant respectfully contends that the trial
judg-t. in permitting the heresay testimony of Officer Ferrill, and i 11 pPrmitting the admission of his notes in eYidencP, rommittt'd rPYersible and prejudicial error, and
tha1 in dt. nying the defendant probation because of his refn~al to conft. ss g-uilt, sho\\·t'}d that it based its exercise of
diRcrt\iiou on an t"~rroneous legnl theory '\\ hich, if permitt.Pd to stand, "·ould require this defendant to testify
7
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against himself, and deny him the protection of the Constitution.
Respectfully submitted,
GORDON I. HYDE
Attorney for
Defendant-Appellant
863 First Security Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah.
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